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the social sciences can play in the context of historical research is undoub-
tedly important. Alternatively the social sciences risk becoming a large gal-
lery of theories and concepts relating to completely abstract causal analo-
gies and potentially unnecessary to the understanding of historical and so-
cial phenomena. 
 
2. Against evolutionary sociology and structural-functionalism  
In order to develop their ideas, both scholars react to the theoretical paradi-
gms of their times. Whereas Gramsci, consistent with the evolutionistic 
conceptions of the social science in the nineteenth century, strongly oppos-
es Marxist determinism, Tilly harshly criticizes the functionalist paradigm, 
which is the natural continuation of nineteenth-century evolutionism. In 
particular, Charles Tilly feels compelled to question the approach of Durk-
heim who, with his emphasis on differentiation processes seen as the pecu-
liar traits of modernity, would strongly influence the subsequent develop-
ment of social theory in a functionalistic sense.  
Sociology and Marxism, for Gramsci, have reached a state of stagnation. 
They have abandoned their original ideological function dissolving in the 
positivist framework. Sociology has become the science of the particular, 
engaged in producing detailed descriptions and sterile classifications. It has 
become an a-moral, a-political and a-historical science. It represented an 
attempt to create a method for historical-political science subordinated to 
evolutionistic positivism, an effort to describe and classify historical and 
political facts in accordance with the logic of natural sciences. It therefore 
represents the effort to experimentally obtain the evolutionary laws of hu-
man society, in order to produce predictions on the future of humanity. Yet, 
Gramsci observes, sociological laws have rarely had a causative signific-
ance, yet they risk falling into tautology by describing an event or a series 
of events and, through a mechanical process of abstract generalization, they 
risk turning a mere relationship of similarity into a law (Gramsci 1977a, 
PN11, 159-163). 
Actually, everything is born from a need, which Gramsci does not hesitate 
to define «somewhat childish and naïve» way to solve the practical prob-
lem of the predictability of historical events. Since the natural sciences se-
em to have the ability to predict the evolution of natural processes, also so-
ciology has been regarded as scientific only when it was able to predict the 
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future of society, thus going back to the essential cause of socio-historical 
events. But even Marx, in his Thesis on Feuerbach, has the opportunity to 
criticize this simplistic concept, because in the human world only «strug-
gle» may reasonably be expected, not its concrete moments that are usually 
the result of conflicting forces, not reducible to some static quantities, be-
cause, inside them, quantity continuously becomes quality (ibid., 173). 
Obviously, Gramsci’s knowledge is limited to the sociology developed by 
classical theorists such as Montesquieu, Comte, Spencer and Durkheim. 
The conditions of their approach are essentially based on the belief that so-
ciety, despite the diversity of cultural forms and social organizations, obeys 
an essential and objective order recognizable in a body of laws that bind 
certain structural elements in a harmonious whole. The task of sociology is, 
therefore, to identify those social relations that take place in such order. But 
the problem about the concept of science lies for Gramsci in understanding 
whether and to what extent it can offer “certainty” of the objective existen-
ce of reality outside the subjects. According to Gramsci, scientific work has 
two fundamental aspects: one that constantly rectifies the world of knowle-
dge by developing complex principles of induction and deduction, and ano-
ther one that uses this complex instrumental apparatus to distinguish what 
is necessary from what is arbitrary, that is transitional. Within this logic, all 
that is determined by all men, and therefore independent from the point of 
view of any individual or group, becomes objective. Yet, also this certainty 
is actually a world vision, therefore ideological. Objectivity is a non-sense 
if we think of it in absolute terms, while its value increases in its relation-
ship with real social conditions. It is a unifying but not always absolute ele-
ment. 
Scientific truths are never final. Otherwise, science itself would cease to e-
xist as such to become an extension of the already known. Therefore, even 
science is nothing but a historical category, that is, a movement in constant 
development that does not allow any form of «metaphysical unknowable», 
thus reducing the unknown to a simple «non-knowledge», which also 
means «not yet known». If we accept this assumption, what matters in 
science is not so much the objectivity of reality but the men who devise 
their research methods and rectify their material means of detection and 
discrimination through the mediation of technology. Considering science as 
the basis of life, as a worldview par excellence that places man in the face 
of reality as it is, is still a mistake, because science itself is an ideology, e-
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ven if in the world of superstructures it plays a privileged role, due to the 
particular importance, the widet extension and the continuity of develop-
ment that its reaction has on the structure. (ibid., 68).  
Some say that Gramsci comes to a complete formulation of the philosophy 
of praxis also through a systematic critique of the Marxist positivism of 
Bukharin who, in his Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology, clear-
ly expounds his deterministic conception based on the belief of the exis-
tence of laws of historical necessity (Bukharin 1921, en.tr. 1965). Accord-
ing to Gramsci, Bukharin’s is a vulgar interpretation of Marxism in which 
the concept of the dialectical development of history disappears. Whereas i-
dealist philosophy focuses on metaphysical categories, in Bukharin's socio-
logy, ideas are replaced by empirical, as well as abstract and a-historical, 
canons and classifications. For Bukharin, economic processes operate re-
gardless of the human will and therefore, according to Gramsci, outside 
history. By eliminating the dialectical relationship between economic pro-
cesses and human consciousness, Bukharin dismisses the active element in 
the historical processes of the collective will. For Gramsci, instead, laws 
are always tendential laws, in the sense that they do not reveal what is fixed 
and immutable but always trends and possibilities. From this point of view, 
the deterministic Marxism of Bukharin becomes fatalistic, thus sanctioning 
the inertia of the masses and their subordination to historical regularities. 
For Gramsci, on the contrary, Marxism does not condemn the masses to a 
condition of cultural liability but aspires to human emancipation achieved 
through the adoption of a critical and historical methodology. 
Whereas positivist Marxism emphasizes a certain historical mechanicism 
by eliminating the role of politics in the process of social transformation, 
for Lenin, the Russian Revolution demonstrates the ability of politics to 
produce mobilization and transformation. By supporting the primacy of 
politics, he actually supports, like Gramsci, a certain dialectical relationship 
between economic structure and ideological superstructure. From this pers-
pective, Gramsci focuses on the role of the superstructures, following the 
approach outlined by Lenin. He does not downsize the historical role of 
economic structures; rather, he restores a proper balance between economic 
processes and political processes. The relations of production no longer act 
in the wake of general and autonomous laws; they are regulated and altered 
by human consciousness. The economical moment of social consciousness 
constitutes the negative phase, a sort of «realm of necessity» in the ascend-
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ing process of the subaltern classes toward a hegemonic situation, which 
instead represents the positive phase, that is, the «realm of freedom» (see 
also Nardone 1971). In reality, Gramsci develops and overcomes Leninist 
thought by focusing more on the element of cultural and ideological rather 
than on political hegemony. According to him, certain superstructural ele-
ments, such as social awareness, culture, ideology represent both a tool and 
an aim of the revolutionary process. In this sense, the concept of «hegemo-
ny» is equal to that of ideological and cultural direction. The proletariat 
must become the ruling (that is hegemonic) class well before becoming the 
dominant class (Gramsci 1977b). The supremacy of a social group in fact 
manifests itself as «domination» and as «intellectual and moral direction». 
This group can and have to exercise a role of leadership before gaining 
power. From this point of view, Gramsci is aware that the Russian revolu-
tionary experience is not exportable to the West, where no transformation 
process can be separated from the consent of the masses. In this sense, an 
ideological revolution acts as a precondition of the political (and social) 
revolution (see Portelli 1972). 
What is needed in the West is the formation of a «historical bloc» deter-
mined by an organic unity between structure and superstructure, in the 
sense that the complex set of ideological superstructures is a reflection of 
the social relations of production. Between the two elements there exists a 
need for reciprocity, which is precisely the real dialectical process (Gramsci 
1977a, 48). The historical bloc is not a sort of amalgamation or alliance be-
tween different classes, but a hegemonic situation in which social cohesion 
is ensured by a new conception of the world (superstructural dimension) 
and a dominant social group (structural dimension). In this context, the 
dominant power of a given social group is not guaranteed by violence and 
by the monopoly of the means of production, but mainly by a more subtle 
process of gaining consensus in relation to other social groups. What seems 
to be of interest to Gramsci is not so much the organization of class rela-
tions, but the mechanisms through which this organization is created and 
perpetuated (Tamburrano 1969). Only through the establishment of a new 
intellectual order, subaltern social groups can be de-alienated. In this con-
text, Antonio Gramsci’s humanist and historicist conception is consolidat-
ed, and his philosophy of praxis becomes pure humanism, that is, a kind of 
dialectic anthropology in which knowledge is reduced to historical social 
relations that are political and ideological. For Gramsci, humanism corres-
ponds, therefore, to the process of structuring human knowledge on the ba-
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sis of the organized will of men. Rather than “nature”, people are “con-
sciousness” that develops through practical activity within a given histori-
cal context of organized social relations.  
The sociological impact of these problems is evident. Gramsci de facto ap-
proaches a historical and humanist sociology of knowledge where there is a 
complete subordination of social phenomena to the critical consciousness 
of the masses (Gallino 1970; Pizzorno 1970). He agrees with the materialis-
tic principle of the social (and structural) determination of knowledge, but 
he is also convinced that this knowledge, while reflecting objective histori-
cal conditions, cannot be objective in the same way. Historical objectivity 
is in fact achieved through an intersubjective consensus among men. In this 
sense, objectivity is always humanized and historicized. Only through a 
historical analysis it is possible to demonstrate objective reality, always 
seen as «humanly objective» or «historically subjective», where the con-
cept of objectivity is declined as a «universal subjective». In fact, «man 
knows objectively in so far as knowledge is real for the whole humankind 
historically unified in a unified cultural system». But this process of histor-
ical unification can only occur if the internal contradictions afflicting socie-
ty disappear, as they are a precondition for the establishment of social 
groups in the struggle for hegemony through the development of different 
philosophical and ideological systems. «There is then a struggle for objec-
tivity (to get rid of the partial and fallacious ideologies) and this fight is the 
same struggle for the cultural unification of mankind». It therefore seems 
clear that there can be no objectivity that is free of man, as stated in a cer-
tain metaphysical materialism. «We know reality only in relation to man 
and, since man is also historical development, knowledge and reality are 
also a historical development, and also objectivity is a development» 
(1977a, PN11, 181-182). 
The same attention to the processes of organization and mobilization of the 
proletarian masses and the same criticism of a certain sociological mecha-
nicism is recognizable in the work of Charles Tilly. According to him, the 
analysis of social change undertaken up to date, with rare exceptions, are 
mostly contaminated by theories and concepts developed in the nineteenth 
century. Yet those scholars came to build their intellectual equipment thro-
ugh a careful observation of the social reality in which they were immer-
sed, characterized by profound demographic changes, by changes in modes 
of production and ways of organizing power. They focused on the concept 
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of  “differentiation” understood as a dominant social process in the modern 
era, and developed conceptions of society largely organized around the idea 
of a delicate balance between the dynamics of differentiation and integra-
tion. According to Tilly, social sciences should adopt a new toolbox that 
can enrich our understanding of large-scale structures and social processes, 
leaving behind the kind of architecture used to understand intellectual 
structures and processes of a bygone era.  
He undertakes this difficult path by wondering if and how the comparison 
between places, peoples, cultures and between social structures and 
processes over time may give a contribution to this ambitious intellectual 
mission. He analyzes a dense historical and sociological literature focusing 
on the comparative analysis of wide socio-historical structures and process-
ses with the aim of demonstrating the inadequacy of old concepts and clas-
sical theories for an understanding of contemporary societies. First, he 
wonders what qualifies the concept of differentiation: undoubtedly the typ-
ical dynamics of modern urbanization, occupational specialization, expand-
ing markets, widespread forms of education and in general all those proces-
ses that seem to create the conditions for an increasingly clear distinction 
between human beings. Second, he wonders what qualifies the concept of 
integration instead: in this regard, sociological literature refers primarily to 
a sense of similarity between individuals of the same society that originates 
from shared beliefs and traditions, from respect for authority, the genera-
lized fear of any form of moral deviance and, generally, from all those cul-
tural habits (and attitudes) that encourage individuals to reproduce the ex-
isting social structure (and system of power). According to this dichotomic 
perspective, if the various and inevitable processes of differentiation do not 
correspond to a boost directly proportional to the process of integration, the 
way is clear for various forms of social disorder which, on a small scale, 
can take the form of popular violence, madness, immorality, and crime, 
while, on a large scale, it can be expressed through different historical for-
ms of rebellion, insubordination, and conflict. It seems clear that this em-
phasis on the concept of social order has been instrumental in reproducing, 
even in the social sciences, a certain model of society. «A victory of diffe-
rentiation over integration produced a threat to bourgeois security» (Tilly 
1984, 4). In sociology, this knowledge gives strength to the great dichoto-
mies that have been proposed by the classics of social thought: status and 
contract, society and community, primary and secondary groups, mechani-
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cal and organic solidarity. Each of these formulas displays the theoretical 
tension between differentiation and integration. 
A superficial reading of the massive social changes occurred in the nine-
teenth century, in Tilly’s view (1984, 11-12), resulted in at least eight «per-
nicious postulates» that gripped twentieth-century social thought. These as-
sumptions are based on the following principles: 1) «society is a thing 
apart», in the sense that the world is divided into several societies that have 
more or less autonomous cultures, power structures and socio-economic 
structures ; 2) «social behavior results from individual mental events» va-
riously conditioned by life in society; in this sense, the explanation for so-
cial behavior is reduced to an analysis of the impact of society on individu-
als; 3) «social change is a coherent general phenomenon» and, therefore, it 
can be explained as a whole, as if it were a monolithic block; 4) «the main 
process of large-scale social change leads distinct societies through a suc-
cession of standard stages», each stage is more advanced than the previous 
one; 5) «differentiation forms the dominant, inevitable logic of large-scale 
change»; 6) «the state of social order depends on the balance between 
processes of differentiation and processes of integration or control», mean-
ing that, when social differentiation is too rapid or excessive, it tends to 
produce disorder; 7) «a wide variety of disapproval behavior – including 
madness, murder, drunkenness, crime, suicide, and rebellion – results from 
the strain produced by excessively rapid social change»; 8) «illegitimate or 
legitimate forms of conflict, coercion and expropriation stem from essen-
tially different processes» of change and disorder on the one hand, and of 
integration and control, on the other.  
Since no society can exercise total social control, these eight postulates en-
compassing the complexity of social beliefs, are for Tilly the result of mis-
judgements, and, most importantly, social behavior is not (or at least not 
exclusively) the result of the impact of society on the minds of individuals, 
but the result of the relationship between individuals and social groups. So-
cial change is not quite a coherent and comprehensive process, but a useful 
general term to describe a series of interrelated processes. And, finally, sta-
ge theories of social change «disappear at the first observation of the real 
social life» (ibid.). These fallacious beliefs have led to the development of 
an artificial division between the social forces that push towards order (so-
ciety, integration, satisfaction, legitimate control, progress, normality) and 
social forces that push towards disorder (individual mental events, disinte-
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gration, tension, violence, decadence, abnormality). It is a dichotomic and 
Manichean framework that serves to affirm the fragility of social order and 
the consequent necessity and justification for forms of control and repres-
sion. It de facto expresses «the will of the power-holders – actual or would-
be – to improve the people around them, by means of coercion and persua-
sion, at a minimum cost» (ibid., 13). But if this theoretical framework is ac-
tually inappropriate to grasp historical and social phenomena,  besides hid-
ing a clearly ideological substrate, how should we act to improve the logic 
and the tools of social analysis? Tilly has no doubt: «We should build con-
crete and historical analyses of the big structures and large processes that 
shape our era» (ibid., 14). Such analyses should not be abstract, but con-
crete, rooted in time and space, and they should be historical, that is, tem-
porally limited to a specific era that inevitably affects the sequence of 
events and social behavior. Of course, stating that the eight postulates are 
wrong (or pernicious) is not enough; we need to explain the reasons why 
we say so. It is therefore worthwhile to explain this position.  
The great achievement of sociology as an academic discipline has been 
based on the belief in the existence of a separate reality called “society”. 
Only the configuration of an intellectual entity distinct from any other 
could justify the existence of a body of specialized researchers, thus confer-
ring on the discipline its substantial autonomy as a “science of society”, 
separate from all other sciences, particularly philosophy. Based on these 
premises, the scholars of the nineteenth century devised a discipline that 
had its own method, its own epistemology and a full conceptual apparatus. 
The same spirit would later originate a sort of division of labor among 
scholars who claimed to belong to one of the many disciplines that could be 
somehow related to the polyhedric system of the social sciences. In particu-
lar, the sociological task was to study modern and affluent societies. This 
aim, however, prompted social scientists to outline mostly fictitious struc-
tures and processes, starting with the totally artificial distinction between 
state and society, where society is anything that the state is not, even if en-
closed in the geopolitical boundaries of a state.  
The difficulties lie, in fact, in the very attempt to establish the boundaries 
of this delimited system called society. Is it really possible to identify these 
boundaries and, in particular, to ensure that they remain stable over time 
and space? How is it possible, inter alia, to determine these boundaries? As 
Tilly observes (ibid., 23), we cannot guarantee a priori that the boundaries 
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existing between nation-states or certain local communities will also mark 
the boundaries of interpersonal relationships, of a specific production sys-
tem, of a delimited system of shared beliefs and, in general, of all those as-
pects that give meaning to an experience in society. Yet, without this guar-
antee, «the idea of a society as an autonomous, organized, interdependent 
system loses its plausibility» (ibid., 25). Rather, it would be convenient to 
abandon the idea of society as an autonomous system by adopting the alter-
native idea of «multiple social relationships», some of which are made on a 
local scale (from state to community), others on a global scale.  
With reference to the second postulate, namely, that social behavior is 
largely determined by mental events, Tilly argues that it is undoubtedly 
convenient to think of the cognitive (individual) dimension as closely re-
lated to social life, or even as the crucial dimension to explain social beha-
vior itself. Based on this conviction, it becomes easy to group individual 
consciousnesses into a single global mindset. Twentieth-century research-
ers relied heavily on this postulate. This is demonstrated by the increasing 
use of research techniques  making use of questionnaire which provide sta-
tistical distributions of individual mental attitudes aggregated in social 
structures. Yet these research methods could be misleading because they 
generally confuse individual orientations with the sociologically relevant 
element of “social ties”. Life in society is not an expression of the sum of 
social atoms, but of a multitude of relationships, which should then divert 
attention to the construction of substantial informal social networks. Of 
course, Tilly comments (ibid., 27), the individual human being does exist 
and has its own specificity, in the sense that every individual social actors 
perceive their belonging to a network and their participation in various 
forms of relationship in different ways. Social relations are nothing but ab-
stractions of multiple interactions between individuals. Yet, that is precise-
ly the point: we don't make abstractions from individual behavior, but from 
a set of individual behaviors that simultaneously involve two or more social 
actors.  
The third postulate is based on the belief that social change is essentially a 
coherent phenomenon. Nevertheless, Tilly observes, it would be really 
amazing to discover that a single and recurrent social process has histori-
cally governed the same logic of change on a large scale. The point is that 
social scientists don't have to explain some specific regularity such as the 
acceleration of falling bodies or the movement of celestial bodies. In the 
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social world, constantly uniform dynamics that can be explained, do not ex-
ist. Of course, «Many large-scale processes of change exist; urbanization, 
industrialization, proletarianization, population growth, capitalization, bu-
reaucratization all occur in definable, coherent ways. Social change does 
not» (ibid., 33). 
The fourth postulate is grounded in the notion of a sort of social evolution 
based on a succession of stages. «Social scientists once used stage models 
of social change as freely as blacksmith use their hammers» (ibid., 41). The 
various theories of modernization, of economic and political development 
are formulated by referring to such interpretative scheme, which is so effec-
tive at the organizational level of logical thinking, as it is flawed and mis-
leading at the level of a concrete analysis of the processes of social change. 
It is based on an evolutionary macro-theory that wedges historical devel-
opment in artificial mechanisms and in a progressive logic that is actually 
much less uniform than the one intended in prevailing sociological frames.  
The idea underlying the fifth pernicious postulate, that differentiation alone 
can be identified as a kind of master process from which all others descend, 
is similarly misleading. The development of naturalistic and evolutionistic 
conceptions undoubtedly urged this belief, which, even in the nineteenth 
century, seemed justified by the occurrence of certain phenomena, such as 
social complexity, the increasing division of labor, the expansion of mar-
kets, which were easily ascribable to mechanisms of differentiation. All so-
cieties seemed destined to stumble along the same conceptual and organiza-
tional path that goes from simple to complex. Only the most diversified so-
cieties seemed destined to survive. Even Talcott Parsons, who at an early 
stage of his intellectual activity seemed to depart from certain evolutionist 
models, ended up embracing them. In 1937 he began his famous work, The 
Structure of Social Action, with a quote from Crane Brinton: «Who now 
reads Spencer? […] We have evolved beyond Spencer» (Brinton 1933, 
226-227, quoted in Parsons 1937, 1). Parsons is therefore convinced that 
the Spencerian approach based on the idea of unilinear evolution, following 
an utilitarian and positivistic scheme, is to be considered definitely out-
dated, and nevertheless, at the end of his intellectual career, he seems to 
explicitly recall the concept of organic evolution. As he writes in an essay 
within a text specifically dedicated to comparison in the social sciences: 
If human “history” consisted of a population of essentially unique “cultures”, as has been 
alleged, this consideration would indeed virtually eliminate the relevance of “comparative 
method”. But empirically, this simply is not the case; history consists rather, like the system 
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of organic species, of an immensely ramified “inverted branching tree” of forms at many 
levels of system reference. 
What ties the “branches”, forms, and levels together into a macro-system, is in the first in-
stance common genetic origin. This is to say that differences among subsystems have, by 
and large, arisen through processes of differentiation from what in some sense have been 
“more primitive” forms. The human socio-cultural universe is by no means so variegated as, 
at least superficially considered, the organic seems to be, but it is by no means narrowly 
constricted (Parsons 1971, 102) 
Also Parsons, in the above passage, besides recovering a clear evolutionist 
approach, embraces the idea of differentiation seen as the dominant social 
process. Tilly’s (1984, 48) criticism of this postulate should not be unders-
tood as a denial of the importance of the process of social differentiation in 
socio-historical development. In his view, this awareness cannot be crystal-
lized, thus hiding a reality that is also characterized by significant dynamics 
of de-differentiation, as clearly demonstrated by the various aspects of phe-
nomena that have been conceptualized under the term “globalization”. Ac-
tually, we cannot speak of a master process from which the others arise. 
The historical development is so complex and varied that any attempt to 
identify a dominant distinctive element would risk, as often happened, con-
taminating the analysis of concrete historical and social processes.  
This critical consideration brings us to the sixth pernicious postulate  based 
on the assertion of an oppositional dialectic between differentiation and in-
tegration, constituting the grounds on which the game of establishing social 
order would be played. Excessive or too rapid differentiation processes are 
therefore carriers of situations of structural disorder, which can be faced by 
increasing the integrative pressure guaranteed by social control and the 
subsequent repression by the political and moral authority of a given socie-
ty. The result of this postulate is likely to be tautological as it relies on 
propositions such as «differentiation produces disorder whereas is equiva-
lent to the absence of order». Actually differentiation undoubtedly produces 
tensions, but such tensions do not represent necessarily a threat to social 
equilibrium. Let’s think about the dialectical conflict between capital and 
labor. Without it, Western societies would probably not have had a real so-
cial pressure towards democratization that is nothing but the aspiration for 
a new order of solidarity. 
This brings us to the seventh pernicious postulate that is essentially based 
on the “equivalence” of different forms of disorder. Whole generations of 
social scientists, in fact, have seen very different phenomena –  such as 
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crime, family instability, social movements and in general all those beha-
viors disapproved by the classical bourgeois culture – as similar expres-
sions of social disorder. All are explained in terms of a sort of social mal-
function brought about by too rapid changes, whose solution requires in-
tense collaboration between social classes and political analysts. Some 
scholars consider these “problems” as the inevitable cost of social devel-
opment: 
The very fact that modernization entrails continual changes in all spheres of a society means 
of necessity that it involves processes of disorganization and dislocation, with the continual 
development of social problems, cleavages and conflicts between various groups, and 
movements of protest, resistance to change. Disorganization and dislocation thus constitute 
a basic part of modernization and every modern and modernizing society has to cope with 
them (Eisenstadt 1966, 20). 
This approach is clearly misleading because it assumes that an ordered so-
ciety is also a static and non-conflictual society, thus neglecting the role of 
conflict in the production of social change. 
All the postulates highlighted by Charles Tilly, therefore, are based on a 
clear separation between the sphere of order and that of disorder, which, in 
real political application, is reflected in the eighth and final postulate that 
relies on the distinction between legitimate force (that of established pow-
er) and illegitimate force, that is an expression of social disorder. All forms 
of challenge to power, from forms of rebellion to organized social move-
ments, become illegitimate, while phenomena such as war, repression, pri-
son, forms of taxation and, generally, all those phenomena aimed to produ-
ce integration by the dominant power become legitimate. As Tilly reminds 
us (1984, 56), these distinctions are fictitious and analytically impractical 
because the same actions may fall on either side of the demarcation line 
and only a political opinion (ie ideological) separates them. Let’s think of a 
resistance movement against a foreign occupation: the actors involved will 
be considered terrorists by the political elites of the occupying power, and 
heroes of freedom by most of the people who are against the occupation. 
Even theoretically, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate force 
is likely to be mind-numbing, firstly, because it tends to reinforce the al-
ready refuted idea of the continuing tension between differentiation and in-
tegration, and secondly, because it tends to separate social phenomena that 
have many aspects in common, and that are generated from similar condi-
tions. In reality, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate use of 
force, at least when forms of collective action are concerned, derives from 
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the forms of historical development of nation-states and from the way pow-
er is organized within them. 
 
3. History meets the social sciences 
The critical sociology of Antonio Gramsci takes shape in the rejection not 
only of positivist Marxism but also of Benedetto Croce’s idealist philoso-
phy. As a theorist of bourgeois liberalism, Croce played in Italy the same 
role Hegel played in Germany (Salamini 1981, 27). The human and histo-
ricist components of Croce's philosophy become a useful conceptual tool 
for Gramsci in his criticism of the Marxist mechanicism of the Second In-
ternational. Although fascinated with Croce’s statement on the historical 
importance of human values, Gramsci clearly distances himself from the 
Italian philosopher on the question of the role actually played by the masses 
in the process of historical determination. Croce's idealism is in fact unable 
to resolve the conflicting relationship between theory and praxis. Accord-
ing to Gramsci, by raising the concrete reality of social conflict to the level 
of ideas, the philosophy of Bendetto Croce becomes an ideological appara-
tus that justifies the existence of abstract, purely speculative and essentially 
a-historica values. When meta-historical values are regarded as absolute 
values, then metaphysics and pure theory take the place of real conflicts 
happening among men. As Salamini observes (ibid., 28), Gramsci's criti-
cism of Croce's idealism can be summed up in four basic points: the con-
cept (and conception) of historicism, the definition of philosophy, the con-
ception of dialectics, and the relationship between theory and praxis.  
Gramsci and Croce seem to agree on the historical and immanent role of 
ideas as well as on their criticism of theories not grounded in historical 
facts, but Croce, unlike Gramsci, gives a metaphysical value to history. 
When Croce says that ideas generate action and that man is the real creator 
of history, he actually refers to a hypostatized, that is, not historically de-
termined, man (Croce 1907, en.tr. 1914; 1915). In Gramsci’s opinion, men 
are the protagonists of concrete struggles, which are structured into real his-
torical processes, by facing the objective reality of social contradictions. If 
for Croce historical creation is reduced to a history of ideas and concepts, 
Gramsci, like Marx, see historical processes mainly as praxis, that is, prac-
tical activity. Ideas become concrete in objective social conditions, and the 
history of science is not metaphysics, but a tool for creating historical con-
